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Abstract. The paper elaborates on changing economic paradigms in India over the past six
decades that finally led to structural adjustment in 1991. The paper investigates how economic
reforms failed to resolve social challenges in India. From the mid-1960s, when Congress
dominance in independent India was challenged for the first time economic crisis and political
instability have been closely related, at times bringing the country close to a civil war. Today
however, India is seen as doing very well, despite increasing unemployment, enormous subsidies
and masses of extremely poor people living surrounded by increasingly affluent middle classes.
In the past economic crisis and political instability were closely related. Urban based industrial-
ization had often caused resistance that mainly came from rural India at various junctures in
India’s recent economic history. Removing poverty, and here in particular rural poverty, would
allow India’s economy to further expand. However if social polarization further widens, if masses
of poor remain excluded from economic success, social dissatisfaction will further enhance
insecurity and violence intensifying political instability and insecurity of the entire Asian region.
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1 Introduction
Not long ago there was a clear understanding which are developed and which are developing
countries in Asia. Then the newly industrializing countries (NICs) appeared in the form of tigers,
a dragon and an elephant. Today we have China and India as important economic players on the
world scene. Two out of five people living on this planet, some 2.6 billion people are either
Chinese or Indian. Both countries are powerful magnets of foreign investment. Companies from
Europe, America and Asia moved to these two economic adolescents to benefit from lower
productions costs, but also to gain access to huge markets. Analysts fear (or hope) that when
fully ‘grown up’ each of these two countries can satisfy whole world demand in many sectors
challenging economic activities elsewhere.
These shifts in the centre of gravity of the world economy are incompatible with development
theories some 30 years ago. Then the global economic structure was seen as dominated by centre
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states, which defined the international division of labour and kept the periphery made of former
colonies dependent. Economic self reliance and dissociation was seen necessary to escape
economic dependency. Well, the Asian Tigers did not just follow this advice: they promoted their
exports; they integrated into the world market whenever they saw an opportunity. What started
with Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, soon continued with China and then with India.
Despite impressive economic success both countries still have huge populations living in
rather poor conditions. In China around 36 per cent of the population lived below US$2 a day
in 2005. For India the corresponding figure was 42 per cent (World Bank 2009). Both countries
together had more than 900 million people with not even US$2 a day. This also means an
enormous market potential that could be realized once both countries further reduce poverty and
convert these masses into consumer capable middle classes.
From a theoretical perspective changes experienced in China and (in this paper in particular)
in India pose questions whether economic success experienced is suitable to remove poverty and
establish secure livelihoods. In a wider perspective the question is of how economic growth and
development are related. Basu (1990, p. 108) reflected on this already before India’s economic
reforms of 1991 started “We must realize that food stocks with the Government is not something
which the people eat, the savings rate is not something which you wear and one cannot sleep
under the roof of foreign exchange. These are just the instruments, which have to be translated
to basic needs. That did not happen in India. This is a puzzle not only about the Indian
performance but in what it says about economic theory and development economics” (Basu
1990, p. 108).
Many observers predict that India’s economic success story might come to a sudden end, if
growing social disparities cannot be contained. Continuing wide-spread poverty especially in
rural areas and among unskilled and semi-skilled urban workers might lead to social unrest that
can threaten not only political stability but also economic development. The situation of the
mid-1970s, but also of 1989 and 1990 document very well how social dissatisfaction and
politically motivated unrest can translate into deteriorating economic performance.
The major purpose of the paper thus is to fathom out, if there is danger that economic
success paired with social failure endangers development in India, development that enhances
well-being of all and that does not just benefit a creamy layer of India’s middle classes. The
question is also about the political economy of the country, the major forces that had been
driving economic change in India. One could assume that economic reforms were lobbied by the
private industry against the resistance of the state. However there is much evidence that there
had been harmony of interests in major economic questions between private and state actors
right from the beginning of independent India. When after 1947, a strong public sector was
created, it happened with support and for the benefit of India’s private industry. When after 1984
and 1991 India’s economy started to open up and overcome the ‘Hindu economic growth’
(Nayar 2006) this harmony of interest was still a major driving force. This continues in the first
years of the twenty-first century, when economic change took up pace and makes India today
appear as one of the few economic success stories this century so far had to offer.
2 Structural adjustment and social-economic development
Administered economic change, or economic reform, has been done at various times and
differing circumstances. Often it was a reflection of either changing economic policy paradigms
or the urgent need to make changes because economic performance of a country was under
severe stress. ‘New deals’ are therefore nothing really unusual. In the 1980s, as a response of the
Third World debt crisis, the demand-driven Keynesian paradigm was replaced by a supply-side
neoliberal paradigm that found its application in structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).
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Most, if not all of these SAPs were initiated when individual countries were facing severe
economic crisis. To approach the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was often seen
as the last resort to get out of misery. Measures to reduce trade deficits, government spending
and public debts were standard tools of such programmes. SAPs in most cases operated with the
devaluation of the national currency, cutting down on subsidies, privatization of public enter-
prises and improving the conditions for private, in particular foreign investment (Grunberg
1998; see also Mosley et al. 1991, Thomas et al. 1991).
Most studies on the impact of SAPs concentrate on macro-economic aspects and often
do not include social impacts like deteriorating health, education and nutritional conditions,
increasing inequalities, declining real wages, poverty, gender inequality and social vulnerabili-
ties (e.g. see Wolf 1989; Chossudovsky 1992, 2003; Lee et al. 2002; Bussolo and Round 2006;
Kuiper and Barker 2006; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Renton et al. 2007). Social conse-
quences of SAPs were often disproportionally borne by the poor, and poor women and children
in particular (Daines and Seddon 1994; Craig and Porter 2006). It was UNICEF in 1987 that
highlighted the negative social consequences of SAPs when it called for ‘adjustment with a
human face’ (Bohle et al. 1990; Jolly 1991; Zuckermann 1991; Siegler and Theis 1993).
The socially adverse impacts of SAPs often triggered social and political unrest (Nathan
2001, Bandy and Smith 2005; Starr 2005; Almeida 2007; Langer and Stewart 2007) by what
some authors called ‘IMF riots’ (Raj and McMichael 2009, p. 9). Walton and Seddon (1994)
report of at least 146 such riots from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s (see also, Walton and
Ragin 1990; Maxwell 1998; Auyero 2001, 2007; Raj 2009; Bush 2010; Bellemare 2011).
3 Economic reform, political instability and conflict in India
Observers consider 1991 the turning point of India’s economic fate. At this point of time India’s
economic order had already changed a lot from the time when the country achieved her
independence. The reforms of 1991 did not begin India’s economic liberalization (Bhattacharya
1999; McCartney 2009), but it accelerated change and without these reforms India would not be
economically where she stands today.
In the 65 years of independence, India has experienced a number of economic crises, often
triggered by drought, political instability or wars with Pakistan or China. Until the mid-1960s
there had been the political dominance of the Congress Party in the federal government as well
as the governments of all Indian states. This also had harmonizing impacts on economic policy
formulation and decision-making.
In 1967, the Swatantra Party defeated the Congress Party in nine state elections shaking
Congress dominance in India for the very first time (Erdman 1963–1964). Increasing unem-
ployment and poverty led to political instability (Narain 1969; Narain and Lal 1969). Although
Singh (1971) contradicts the thesis of political polarization (see also Palmer 1967), he also sees
in the political events of 1967 a cause of increasing political instability. “The most striking
consequence of the Congress reverses in 1967 has been a high degree of political instability in
north Indian states [. . .]. For the first time since independence, 9 out of 17 states, with 65 per
cent of India’s population, came under the rule of inherently unstable coalitions” (Singh 1971),
that also led to a sharp increase in politically motivated violence. “In 1966–67 the election
campaign was carried out in an atmosphere of frustration, despondency, uncertainty, and
recurrent – almost continual – agitation. The year 1966 was generally described as ‘the worst
since independence’, largely because of the deteriorating economic situation, with rising prices
and a food shortage approaching near-famine proportions in Bihar and parts of other States, the
deterioration of the law and order situation, with increasing resort to bands, ghera dalos, strikes,
and other forms of public protest and mass agitation, often resulting in destruction of property
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and sometimes in loss of life, and the growing loss of confidence in the top leadership of the
country under Congress rule” (Palmer 1967, p. 277).
In the elections of 1971 Mrs. Gandhi was able to stabilize her position with a distinct
anti-poverty campaign (Garibi Hatao – remove poverty; Kothari 1972; Kurien 1972; Ranadive
1973; Joshi and Desai 1978), but in the following years social polarization and dissatisfaction
weakened Indira Gandhi’s Government further (Banerjee 1973; Klieman 1981; Kothari 1988;
Prasad 1991; Prashad 1996).
With the drought of 1972 many farmers slipped into poverty. Increasing costs for agricul-
tural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, energy and machines) let profits decline even when the
drought was over (Vaidyanathan 1991). When India Gandhi tried to nationalize the wholesale
sector of cereals, rural elites saw this as attack against them. Fierce protests and boycotts
followed and food prices increased further. Bad harvests in 1972 and 1973, the third war
between India and Pakistan in 1971, which (again) led to cuts in US aid, increase in public
spending because of Indira Gandhi’s populist policies as well as excessive spending for police
forces let state finances skyrocket and fuelled inflation.
In 1971 Mrs. Gandhi had won elections promising to fight poverty, restrict the power of
big business and control foreign companies. Still, at a time when economic growth in India
stagnated, Indian as well as foreign companies did well while social polarization widened.
Economic crisis, but even more so economic inequality and increasing social and economic
disparities were the cause for politically motivated unrest and protest (Prasad 1977). In 1973
violent conflicts erupted in many Indian cities. In 1974 the situation did not calm down. Inflation
rose to more than 30 per cent. All over India dissatisfaction with the Government surfaced. In
Gujarat warehouses were plundered and the military called in (Shah 1974). In Bihar an uprising
against the Congress-led State Government was also put down by the army (Shah 1977). Under
J.P. Narayan, a distinguished follower of Mahatma Gandhi, many demanded a change in India’s
economic philosophy: instead of industrialization, the fulfilment of basic needs should have
highest priorities. Other demands were the fight against corruption, reduction of unemploy-
ment, promotion of agriculture, fight against inflation, and the resignation of Indira Gandhi
(Narayan 1975). When Narayan announced further protests Indira Gandhi declared the State of
Emergency (Dutt 1976; Puri 1995; Dhar 2000). Around 200,000 people were put into jail
without trial.
Mrs. Gandhi tried to disguise her mistakes through populist measures: in a 20 point
programme she promised to bring food prices down, give land to the landless, write off debts of
small farmers, give secure tenure to urban poor in slums, expand irrigation infrastructure,
improve electricity generation and public transport and much more. Few of these promises were
put to action. The Government more and more was seen as promoter of the interest of big
business houses, foreign investors and India’s middle and upper classes. Mrs. Gandhi banned
strikes, cut down minimum wages for industrial labourers and extended working hours (Frank
1977). Private companies received tax cuts and investment incentives. Many licences were
abolished. Foreign companies saw a liberalization of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
(FERA) allowing higher foreign equity in many sector, tax cuts and better conditions when
transferring profits out of India. The elections of 1977 saw Congress lose.
When Moraji Desai became Prime Minister in 1977 he depended on parties that covered all
ideological facets, from ultra-left to the ultra-right. The common consensus was ‘being anti-
Congress’. In the new Government also, forces dominated that spoke in favour of India’s rural
areas, a conflict between rural India (Bharat) and the modern, urban-based industrial India was
well constructed to disguise differences in rural India that were based on class and caste.
Unemployment and poverty were widespread and an economic policy designed by Charan
Singh (Brass 1993), and closely adopted from Mahatma Gandhi’s economic philosophy was
hoped to overcome India’s social challenges (Singh 1978). A core piece of Singh’s economic
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concept was the promotion of agricultural development instead of industrialization. The state
should regain its erstwhile economic power, small-scale and village industries should be better
protected against competition from big industrial companies (Datt 1987). However India’s
agricultural structure was not to be touched, no land reform was possible in a government where
rural elites were well represented. The heterogeneity of the Janata Government led to its collapse
after 2 years, when Charan Singh left the government to form his own party. Prime Minister
Desai had to resign and Singh was asked to form a new government. “Just when the Indian
economy urgently needed a concerted drive from a well-ordered polity to ensure the continua-
tion of the gains made in recent years in the face of mounting problems in early 1979,
the national leaders decided to stage a frantic struggle for chair, office and instant power”
(Das Gupta 1980, 176), Singh’s minority government was incapable of action. A vote of no
confidence by the Congress Party brought his short rule to an end.
4 The phase of early liberalization: 1980–1991
It was not new love of India’s voters but a hopelessly divided government that brought Indira
Gandhi back to power in 1980. On the economic front things looked rather unsettled. In 1979
India had experienced the severest decline in food production since independence. With the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the arms race between India and Pakistan saw a new dimen-
sion. The second oil crisis (1979) had devastating impacts on India’s balance of payments.
India’s oil import bill increased from US$180 million to US$6.6 billion between 1970 and 1980
while import quantities did not double (Rangarajan 1988).
In the 1980s economic reforms were carried through more rigidly than earlier (Mehta 1988).
A loan from the IMF accelerated this. India agreed to further reduce the importance of public
enterprises and strengthen private industries. Spatial disparities were to be reduced by providing
incentives for investment in disadvantaged regions. Export-orientated industries were promoted.
State governments were asked to take over uneconomic enterprises with the purpose of reha-
bilitating them (Lucas 1988). Instead of heavy and capital goods industries private consumer
industries, pharmaceutical and chemical industries became the growth sectors of the 1980s
(Kurien 1989). This change in emphasis became possible through a fast growing Indian middle
class, which was willing and able to buy high quality consumer items. This middle class was the
result of public servants enjoying disproportionately high increases in their income. While
prices between 1971 and 1992 increased by about 500 per cent, incomes in the public service
shot up by almost 1,000 per cent (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division
various years). Production of consumer items increased by more than 10 per cent annually in the
1980s (Kelkar and Kumar 1990). However there was hardly any increase in industrial employ-
ment. Economic expansion was almost entirely achieved through higher productivity.
After Indira Gandhi’s assassination 1984, liberalization was continued and accelerated by
her son and successor as Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, especially in the first two years of his
tenure (Harriss 1987). Licensing in the industrial sector was further liberalized, mainly in
consumer electronics (Kumar 1985). Many export restrictions were done away with or simpli-
fied. Sectors that had good export potentials were exempted from import licences for capital
goods (Wadhva 1988). As additional incentives to export production a tax discount of 50 per
cent was given on profits from export income. After 1988 profits from export business were
entirely exempted from taxes. Many import restrictions were transformed into tariffs and
existing import tariffs reduced. Additional sectors reserved for public investment were opened
for private investment, the most important telecommunication.
To strengthen internal demand the top tax rate was reduced from 62 to 40 per cent. Other tax
rates were reduced by 12 to 15 per cent. Gross income below RS. 30,000 became tax free. “Out
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of about four million income tax payers, one million are becoming entirely tax-free, while the
remaining three million will pay substantially less than at present” (Datta 1985: 694). To
compensate for losses a number of indirect taxes, import tariffs for crude oil and also freight
rates for the Indian Railway were increased. Products with high transport or energy component
increased in price (Basu 1985). “The basic fact behind all this is that on the net balance the rich
will benefit from the tax reliefs and the poor will bear the burden of the tax-pushed rise in prices”
(Datta 1985: 697).
Trades Unions saw the attempt to curtail the public sector as an attack on them (Malhotra
1990). Criticism also came from parts of private industry and from within the Congress Party. It
more and more became evident that Indian companies were hopelessly outdated. Only big Indian
companies (often in joint ventures with foreign investors) were able to do well. Between 1980 and
March 1992, the number of severely indebted companies increased from about 25,000 to more
than 240,000. In 1992, a staggering 96.6 per cent of sick companies were small-scale industries
(Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division various years). Many ‘sick
companies’ were converted into public enterprises or closed illegally in the 1980s (Garg 1992).
After 1986 some reforms were taken back, in particular the reduction/abolition of import
taxes, which had exposed Indian companies to foreign competition. In the budget of 1987–88
import tariffs for capital goods were increased to 85 per cent (from 55 per cent), for power plants
to 35 per cent (from 25 per cent) and for fertilizer production from 0 per cent to 15 per cent
(Budget 1987–1988).
Inflation and declining real incomes increased social tensions, but the economic crisis was
most visible in the condition of government finances. Income from direct taxes lagged behind
expectation and also could not be compensated through an increase in indirect taxes. There also
had been a sharp increase in all sorts of subsidies, in particular for fertilizer, exports and food
(Swamy 1994).
5 The National Front Government
In the elections late 1989 the Congress Party was voted out of power by a coalition that brought
together rural as well as minority votes – people who were unhappy with liberalization and
industrialization. An all-India farmer’s movement had gained momentum. It was successful
in integrating peasant farmers and landless labourers by adding demands for an increase in
minimum wages, reduction in working hours, ban on dowry, fight against corruption, etc. As in
1977, the rural elite was successful in disguising class conflicts in India’s countryside by
constructing a conflict between agricultural, rural India and industry, urban India: a conflict
between ‘Bharat’ and ‘India’. In the elections rural elites, supported by peasant farmers and
agricultural labourers, were able to defeat Congress badly which suffered its biggest decline in
votes from scheduled castes and tribes, that is, the most disadvantaged groups in India’s society
as well as from Muslim voters (India Today 15 December1989). For the third time in India’s
history a politician, V.P. Singh, became Prime Minister who did not come from the Congress
Party. Singh however needed support from the nationalist Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) and the
communist parties, which agreed to support the government from ‘outside’.
The Government of the National Front was unstable. Prime Minister Singh, former Finance
Minister under Rajiv Gandhi and architect of his economic reforms favouring rapid industrial-
ization. He now headed a government that had given rural India and agricultural development
highest priorities in its election campaign. At Singh’s side stood Devi Lal as Deputy Prime
Minister, a powerful landowner from Haryana and leader of the North Indian farmer’s move-
ment. The conflict between ‘Bharat’, the rural India and ‘India’ the urban India, orientated
in industrial development was present in the leadership of the Janata Government. The
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Government was supported by the BJP, which presented the conflict between Hindus and
Muslims in India. From the left the Government was supported by the Communist parties,
representing the class conflict. These three cleavages, which are rather difficult to reconcile
dominated India’s politics in the 11 months that V.P. Singh’s Government was in power.
6 The collapse of political culture after 1989: Mandal, Mandir and power
Corruption, favouritism and political violence are a long and important ingredient in India’s
politics. During the election campaign the Janata Dal had announced a fierce fight against these
nuisances. V.P. Singh took over as Prime Minister as ‘Mr. Clean’, as a politician who not only
had an image of being beyond corruption, but who had announced fighting corruption in India.
Already when he was Finance Minister in Rajiv Gandhi’s Government he fought corruption and
tax evasion and was therefore ‘demoted’ to become Defence Minister. There he continued to be
whistle blower and uncovered the Bofors scandal, where enormous amounts of bribe money was
paid by a Swedish arms dealer to the Congress Party.
In a democracy like India, which is fragmented into many ethnical, religious, linguistic and
socio-economic groups parties have to try to address the electorate by addressing issues that
concern many groups at the same time, to keep vote banks happy, especially when elections are
around the corner. It is difficult in India to speak of a voter base, as voter fluctuation is big, leading
politicians to often change their party affiliation and new parties come up frequently and old ones
disappear. The contradiction of trying to establish parties that are able to integrate big masses in
a social environment where the electorate more and more polarizes has been a big challenge for
Indian politics. Successful politicians are those who are able to create an image that they concern
the interests of their electorate, even if they do not. More important is what ‘appears to be’ rather
than what really is. Often symbolic gestures are used to strengthen the bond to the electorate.
When in December 1989 the Government of the National Front took office it was unclear,
if it was able to complete a full five years’ tenure. Commentators were sceptical that this was
likely. Many even doubted that the heterogeneous Janata Dal Party would survive five years or
break apart before. Politicians were therefore rather busy in building their ‘images’ as the next
election seemed to be looming. V.P. Singh was working on a ‘social’ image, an image that he
gave support to the disadvantaged groups in society, the poor classes and castes.
Already in the early months of 1990, Singh and his deputy Devi Lal clashed a number of
times. The relationship worsened in July 1990, when Devi Lal tried to make his son Om Prakash
Chautila, Chief Minister of Haryana, the position Devi Lal had vacated when he joined the
Janata Dal Government. To become Chief Minister, Chautila had to win a by-election to gain a
seat in the Parliament. However he was accused of having rigged voting and incited violence
which cost the lives of more than 20 people (Lakshmana 1990; Shourie 1992). The confrontation
even resulted in the resignation of 15 ministers from Singh’s cabinet. Even the Prime Minister
had announced his resignation, but was convinced by the leadership of the Janata Dal to continue
(Menon 1990). Devi Lal was finally dismissed from the cabinet on 1 August 1990 (The Hindu
2 August 1990). Within the Janata Dal Party he was largely isolated. He therefore tried to
organize his original power base and called for a mass demonstration of farmers and other rural
population to New Delhi on 9 August 1990 (The Hindu 3 August 1990).
Two days earlier Prime Minister Singh announced that his Government decided to imple-
ment the recommendations of the Mandal Commission from 1980 to reserve 27 per cent of jobs
in the public sector for disadvantaged communities, which so far had not been considered by
earlier reservation quotas (other backward communities – OBCs). V.P. Singh’s announcement
split the electorate of the Janata Dal into two groups that were irreconcilable: Those who hoped
that they could benefit from this new reservation quota and those who saw their career changes
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vanish. In rural areas of North India, the tensions that arose were the worst and led to widespread
violence. The alliance of big farmers with peasant farmers and landless labourers established by
Devi Lal with support of MS Tikait, a powerful farmers’ leader and Secretary General of the
Bharatyia Kisan Movement (All Indian Farmers Movement) fell apart. The most influential
agricultural castes (Ahirs, Jats, Gujjars and Rajputs, often referred to as AJGAR Alliance) were
not to benefit from this new reservation policy (with the exception of the Ahir Caste). However
poorer groups like the Yadavas and other small farmers’ as well as many castes of landless
agricultural labourers would receive reservation privileges they earlier did not have (Menon
1990). “Bihar went up in flames. Rajputs especially, who went all out in support of V.P. Singh
during the last elections, viewed the Prime Minister’s action as a betrayal [. . .] Frenzied mobs
of youth and students went on the rampage, damaging and setting ablaze railway stations and
trains, police and private vehicles, government offices, post offices and telephone exchanges and
holding up rail and road movement for almost a fortnight” (Upadhyaya 1990, p. 28). Similar
outbreaks of violence happened all over North India.
Singh’s timing to announce his reservation policy is closely connected with the split in
the Janata Dal Government. “V.P. Singh played his trump card by announcing the decision to
reserve for OBCs 27 per cent of all categories of posts under the Central Government and in its
undertakings. This was on August 7, two days prior to Devi Lal’s massive kisan [peasant] rally
on the central vista in New Delhi. The only way to meet the challenge posed by Devi Lal was
to meet him on his own ground – the rural constituency” (Chakravarty 1990, p. 24).
Until now Singh was able to survive the confrontations with his deputy Devi Lal rather
unhurt as the BJP and the two communist parties in India gave him their support making it clear
that they would not tolerate any Prime Minister other than V.P. Singh. Through this confronta-
tions within the Janata Dal Government had been mitigated as there was no alternative to the
ruling Prime Minister. Overthrowing V.P. Singh would have resulted in the end of the Janata Dal
Government and in new elections. When Singh however announced his reservation policy the
BJP began to see him as a threat. Straight after Singh’s announcement on 7 August Lal Krishan
Advani, the leader of the BJP, decided to conduct a religious procession (Rath Yatra) through
major parts of India. The procession would end in October 1990 in the North Indian city of
Ayodhya, which allegedly was the birth place of the legendary Lord Rama. In 1528 Mogul
ruler Babur had constructed a mosque in a place where allegedly there had been the Ram
Janmabhoomi temple. Advani’s objective was to re-build a Hindu temple (Mandir) at the place
of the Babri mosque. Until then it were in particular fundamental Hindu organizations like the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, Hindu World Council) and the militant Rashtriya Swayam Sevak
Sangh (RSS) which spoke in favour of the destruction of the Babri mosque. For two reasons the
BJP now changed its mind: the party realized in the elections of 1989 that it is possible to gain
a lot of votes with a Hindu-centred ideology. While the BJP decided to support the Janata Dal
Government it avoided overemphasizing this conflicting issue. The intention was to consolidate
power and to take up a clearer Hindu ideology in the next election, which was still five years into
the future (India Today 15 December 1989). Then Ayodhya surely would have become a central
issue in the BJP campaign. The development within the Janata Dal made it clear that elections
might be just around the corner. When V.P. Singh opened his ‘election campaign’ by announcing
the reservation policy the BJP felt impelled to follow. On 25 September Advani started his Rath
Yatra. The Government made it very clear that he would not be permitted to reach Ayodhya.
Advani, other leaders of the BJP, VHP, RSS and about 200,000 of their supporters were arrested
on 23 October in the city of Samastipur (Bihar) (Pachauri 1990). On the very same day the
chairman of the BJP parliamentary group, A.B. Vajpayee, informed the Indian President that his
party had withdrawn support to the Janata Dal Government (Aggarwal and Chowdhry 1991;
Hindustan Times 24 October 1990). This was the end of the Government of V.P. Singh, which
later even saw Singh himself expelled from the Janata Dal (Muralidhar Reddy 1990).
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Only eleven months after V.P. Singh had become Prime Minister it became clear that he was
not able to fulfil the expectations of those who had seen him and his party as a viable alternative
to Rajiv Gandhi and Congress. His Government tumbled from one crisis to the next and it
became evident that the Government was not able to abolish corruption and violence. To the
contrary: to prolong the life of the Government all major actors invented increasingly more
dubious actions which brought India close to a civil war. The distinct ideological heterogeneity
of the Janata Dal Government only could result in such a chaos. Each politician and each party
were busy getting a favourable starting position for the forthcoming elections. However it is
unjust to only blame V.P. Singh. His fault and the fault of the Janata Dal was that they did not
put Devi Lal in his place. To give him his head meant that his power continued to increase, while
Singh’s reputation and the reputation of the Janata Dal Party as a whole declined month by
month.
The political culture in India, that is, the common understanding and agreement in society
of what measures are considered legitimate to achieve political goals or political power suf-
fered a lot in the past few decades in India. The year 1990 had set new standards. Apart from
the fact that an obviously insatiable hunger for power put up with the loss of thousands of
lives, it also prevented politicians to do what they are actually voted for in power: to work out
concrete suggestions and measures of how to improve people’s lives and how to form and
change society in a way acceptable to many, especially to those who elected the politicians
into power.
Despite many serious challenges, parliamentary affairs were put on hold largely. Important
decisions on trade and industrial policies were delayed. Even the work and finalization on
India’s Eighth Five Year Plan, which was to start in 1990, had to be postponed. “For the poor,
there was not even a gesture – only a catalogue of legislation passed and the glitter of more to
come [. . .] Indeed, the poor were being driven to the wall by the rising prices, the Mandal-
generated division and the canker of communalism [. . .] Once the riots began – first caste-based
in early September and then denominational – they never seemed to abate. They are still blazing;
if anything, the fury has intensified and they have spread all over the country. Nothing like this
has happened in recent times. The system seemed in chaos” (Sahay 1990, pp. 10f).
1990 was a year in which violence and terror brought India to the brink of a civil war.
First the Janata Government mangled itself before finally brought down by the BJP. The power
struggles resulted in an irresponsible negligence of economic decision-making. Economic
challenges were not taken up, but allowed to escalate. When in early 1991 India was almost
insolvent, only a loan from the IMF was able to buy some extra time. However it was foreseeable
that the loan of US$1.8 billion was not enough to help India to survive for more than 6 months.
Fresh credits were unavoidable.
7 Structural adjustment in India
SAPs in India, like in many other parts of the world, were seen by most from their macro-
economic impacts. Although India’s political landscape contains many major parties that over
the decades always had been critical of the World Bank and IMF, the economic reform of 1991
was critically assessed only by few, in particular the two communist parties of the country.
Congress (I), under which the reform had started, but also the BJP, at that time major opposition
party supported the reforms.
Among social scientists response was mixed. The Mumbai published Political and
Economical Weekly (EPW) became a mouthpiece of economists and political scientists who
critically, but very constructively accompanied the reforms. Many national and regional
Non-governmental Organizations in the field of development and human rights dismissed the
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reforms as a sell out of the interests of India’s poor and environment to the Bretton Woods
agreements. Often their criticism included the Uruguay Round of GATT, which entered its
decisive phase in India’s early years of structural adjustment.
Alamgir (2009, p. 2) remarks that a sustainable reform process has survived since 1991,
seven changes in government and regardless of which party holds power he rules out “any
reversal in India’s new economic orientation, a notion which is not shared by all observers. Five
years after the SAP had started Joshi and Little (1996) give an evaluation of the reforms which
indeed reads rather pessimistic. Despite of a number “very remarkable achievements” (Joshi and
Little 1996, p. 258), the principal failure is identified as the lack of expenditure control in the
form of fertilizer and food subsidies. For the time after the 1996 elections the authors predicted
that reform efforts would slow down as “Congress is not a party of liberal reform” and “the
momentum of reform has been lost” (Joshi and Little 1996, p. 263). Srinivasan and Tendulkar
(2003) paint a more positive picture of what had been achieved in the 1990s. However, they also
consider the reforms as incomplete and are doubtful if a second generation of reforms can
be added easily as it does not command much political support. They expect resistance from
Trades Unions that oppose further privatization and public sector reforms, farmers and urban
consumers alike that not easily giving up on food and other agricultural subsidies.
Jalan (1991) presents a comprehensive account of India’s economic crisis. Highlighting the
importance of India’s economic structure and institutions that had emerged soon after 1947 he
strongly suggests now that a paradigmatic change was urgently needed to take India success-
fully into the 1990s and beyond. Also Bhattacharya (1992) presents a detailed account of
India’s financial crisis, the country’s debt burden and the government’s response to it. While
he speaks in favour of far reaching economic reforms he expresses concerns about IMF
conditionalities that in other instances often did not bring economic recovery, but made eco-
nomic conditions worse and turned out to be socially and environmentally harmful. Debroy
(1992) looks at the economic crisis concentrating on India’s foreign trade policy that was to
bring the country back on track. Referring to an article from The Economist he is confident
that “India is not merely capable of making great inroads into poverty over the coming decade
[. . .] It is an economic miracle waiting to happen. Indians are fond of saying that whereas
Japan, South Korea and the other thriving economies of East Asia are tigers, their own country
is an elephant; immense, cautious, slow-moving, but also sure-footed, strong, purposeful”
(cited in Debroy 1992, 126).
Publications that are more critical about India’s reform highlight in particular the dissatis-
factory conditions in many social sectors and many of India’s rural areas. Datta (1992, p. 251)
analyses India’s economic problems similar to those mentioned already, but at the same time
he warned that in the course of economic reforms many “wrong turns” are possible that won’t
solve the challenges of social and economic justice. Like Datta (1992), Ghosh (1992) also sees
planning in India at an important crossroad. Political decentralization and primacy to social
development is a greater need than the quest for rapid economic growth. “We need to blend our
economic programmes with a concern about the social impact of our development policies”
(Ghosh 1992, p. 285). Also Nadkarni et al. (1991) reflect on India’s economic challenges for
the 1990s. Many authors in this volume express dissatisfaction with the poor state of social
development in India after more than 40 years of independence. Most of the 21 contributions
emphasise the importance of decentralization along with increasing participation of people in
planning processes, decision-making and implementation of programmes as the way ahead.
Kurien (1992, p. 50) goes even a step further when he puts social and economic disparities and
ethical dimensions arising from them in the centre of his reflection. His major question is not
why India’s economy after 40 years of independence is not performing better, but why after four
decades of independent rule and planned development “mass poverty remains an entrenched
reality in India”.
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Bhargava’s (1994) concentrates entirely on social well-being and economic reform. In
nine papers impacts of economic reforms on the most vulnerable sections of India’s society are
explored as well as possible public interventions in favour of vulnerable sections. Aspects of
food security and public distribution of food (PDS) as well as social safety nets to counterbal-
ance the impact of privatization and closure of ailing companies were seen crucial to prevent
social erosion as a result of economic reforms.
Mathew (2006) looks at how employment and unemployment has developed in the post-
reform period. He highlights that the worker-population ratio has been declining in the post-
reform period, in particular during the later years of reform, namely, 1999–2000. Exception is
male employment in urban areas which has increased slightly. The period between 1993–1994
and 1999–2000 witnessed a marked rise in the unemployment rate among rural workers,
male as well as female” (Mathew 2006, p. 138), while for the urban population, male as well as
female, unemployment has fallen. Also Ahsan and Narain (2007) report of similar trends:
compared to 1993–1994 there had been considerable higher unemployment rates in 2004 for
rural male (1993–1994: 3.0 and 2004: 4.7) and female (3.0 against 4.5). In urban areas the
increase in unemployment is less for urban female (8.4 against 9.0) and urban male (5.2 against
5.7) (Mathew 2006, p. 304). Overall the authors observe that “the Indian economic did not
generate enough jobs as were needed” (Mathew 2006, p. 305). In addition while high-wage
earners experienced a high wage growth “for most workers, however, wage growth was slower
in the 1990s than in the previous decade (Mathew 2006, p. 317).
Deolalikar (2008) remarks that in many social sectors, Bangladesh has better records than
India, despite being poorer and having slower economic growth. Although most authors agree
that the share of people below the poverty line has declined after the reforms started, there is
much confusion about poverty statistics, especially for the later years of the reform period
(Mehta and Shah 2003; Deaton and Kozel 2005). Also Bardhan (2010, p. 7) cannot see much
improvement in India’s effort to alleviate poverty: “As for poverty in India, the national
household survey data suggest that the rate of decline in poverty has not accelerated in 1993–
2005, the period of intensive opening of the economy, compared to the 1970s and 1980s, and
that some non-income indicators of poverty such as those relating to child health, already rather
dismal, have hardly improved in recent years”. The official government perspective is that
economic reforms had led to an acceleration of poverty decline. Deaton and Dreze (2002) and
Lal et al. (2001) support this view. Bhalla (2002), Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003), as well as
Sen and Himanshu (2004) argue that the reduction of poverty continued at a slower pace after
reforms had started (Siggel 2010).
Inequality and poverty in India have a distinct spatial dimension (Mehta and Shah, 2003).
There are indications that economic reforms have further polarized regional disparities. Espe-
cially in the most disadvantaged regions where there is still a high incidence of poverty, and little
hope for a better future. From some remote areas there had even been reports of starvation and
the suicide of hundreds of thousands of farmers in various parts of India also gives some ideas
about unsatisfactory social conditions in many parts of rural India. With regards to the impacts
of economic reforms on rural areas, Dev (2004, p. 4422) concludes that “rural India is not
‘shining’” (see also Basu 2011).
Hardly two months had passed since the then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh had put his
budget for the year 1991–1992 before the Parliament, when in September 1991 news about
deaths from starvation in Andhra Pradesh shocked India (Nagaraj and Krishnakumar 1994). At
the same time India’s newspapers were reporting about the third record harvest in a row. The
death from starvation did not happen in drought-prone and marginalized regions of Andhra
Pradesh, but in the fertile and agriculturally highly developed region delta of the Godavari and
Krishna rivers. The victims all belonged to a single occupational group: the weaver caste. The
reasons for this tragedy are quickly listed: cotton yarn, the raw material for the weavers was
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more often exported instead feeding local demand. The powerful lobby of textile mills managed
to pressure through the abolition of export restrictions for cotton yarn. Between 1987 and 1990
export volume almost had tripled, which caused an increase in cotton yarn prices by more than
200 per cent. The weavers, who were just able to feed themselves and their families with a
monthly income of about 600 rupees were no more able to produce under such conditions
without occurring financial losses. The 300 rupees which they now had every month were not
enough to buy even the very basic items for survival. More than 100 deaths were the result in late
1991 (Krishnakumar 1995).
Also in the years after 1991 many of India’s rural areas (still) have very high numbers of
poor. Newspapers report again and again about farmers who commit suicide as their social and
economic situation appears futile to them. According to Nagaraj (2008) about 200,000 farmers
committed suicide between 1995 and 2006. Economic decline of entire regions is a rather
complex process, closely related to rural economic challenges as well as political neglect of
agriculture (Dantwala 1991; Nadkarni 1991; Vyas 1994). India’s most disadvantaged regions
contrast widely from the growth centres of the country, social and economic conditions there are
appalling (FIAN 2008; Gruère et al. 2008; Patnaik 2009; Samu 2010; Kalamkar and Shroff
2011). Indebtedness, caused by commercialization of agriculture, declining government support
for the agricultural sector as well as privatization of micro credit for farmers seem to play a
crucial role in often desperate situations (Nair 2011; Schmidt 2010).
In 2010 about 52 per cent of India’s workforce was employed in agriculture. According to
the 2011 Census almost 70 per cent of India’s population is still living in rural areas, in about
600,000 villages. Their lives more and more are influenced by decisions that are made far away
from them, and in most of the cases they have little input in such decision-making processes.
Today far more than 200 million people in India suffer from severe forms of chronic malnutri-
tion or undernourishment, more than 2.5 million children die every year before the age of five
(Banik 2007). Globally, 29.3 per cent of all deaths of newborns happen in India, where there are
also 16.1 per cent of child deaths, more than 2.3 million in 2005 (Gakidou and Lopez 2010).
Although India was successful in preventing major famines since 1947, many observers take
such or similar figures as very worrying indications that the country might have improved a lot
in her macro-economic indicators without alleviating the dismal situation of a very large section
of her population. In Karnataka for example, where the capital Bangalore is often called India’s
Silicon Valley, 45.9 per cent of children below three years are underweight and the infant
mortality rate 43 per 1,000. “The problem in child malnutrition in Karnataka – which, ironically,
boasts the software capital of the country – may not seem as dire as in some other States such
as Madhya Pradesh, but this is because of the relative prosperity of southern and coastal
Karnataka which lifts the average across the State. The incidence of undernourishment is severe
in the backward districts of north Karnataka” (Sayeed 2011, p. 94). India’s economic success
has increased unequal distribution of wealth and assets. While in 2001–2002 the country’s
middle class was around 5.7 per cent of the population, it owned 60 per cent of the air
conditioners, and 25 per cent of all TV sets, fridges and motorcycles (Jha 2008, p. 28).
8 Structural adjustment and social-economic performance
When Congress came back to power in June 1991 India’s economy was close to collapse.
External as well as internal debts were beyond manageable levels, the trade balance had
chronically been negative for years and inflation rates were higher than ever before, especially
for food and other basic items. There was no doubt that India was facing her severest crisis
since independence. The collapse of the Soviet Union had deprived the country of an important
trade partner, the first Iraq war led to a huge evacuation effort of Indians out of Kuwait and
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subsequently loss of huge amounts of remittances. In early 1991 foreign exchange reserves of
the country were just enough to pay imports for less than two weeks. India had accumulated the
third biggest international debts of any Third World country next to Mexico and Brazil.
Soon after Congress was back to power it continued negotiations with the IMF for structural
adjustment loans to strengthen its balance of payment. India already had loans of US$10 billion
approved by the International Development Association (IDA), but these loans were yet to be
paid out. Non-residential Indians became worried about the security of their savings and
transferred about US$4 billion out of the country between April and June 1991 (Swamy 1994).
Even pledging India’s gold reserves valued at US$400 million was not enough to slow down the
train towards insolvency. More fresh money was badly needed. By the end of July, the World
Bank had set up a credit programme for 1992–1995, which promised loans from the IMF and
World Bank in the range of US$12.25 billion (Swamy 1994). Once the package was approved
other donors joined in. The Aid India Consortium provided US$6.7 billion for 1991 and US$7.2
billion for 1992 (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division various years).
The reform centred on two economic programmes that were closely tied to each other: the
first was a macro-economic stabilization package monitored by IMF which aimed at improving
the balance of payment situation as well as a reduction of government spending. Under the
auspices of the World Bank comprehensive economic reforms were to be carried out, covering
trade, industrial development, foreign investment, privatization and financial sector reform
(Pederson 1994).
The IMF and World Bank had used India’s worsening balance of payments situation of the
late 1980s / early 1990s to assert pressure on India to change her economic paradigms. The
reforms reflect economic interests in developed countries to expand activities to India’s huge
and vast expanding market. However many in India also welcomed the reforms. Structural
adjustment in 1991 was partly a continuation of policies from 1980 and 1984, which in the
meanwhile had lost their dynamic. The structural adjustment of 1991 however, also had new
qualities: while in earlier liberalization attempts India’s public economic sector was not funda-
mentally questioned, this new attempt came along with a wave of privatization, thinning out the
list of sectors reserved for public enterprises, allowing more and more multinational corpora-
tions into the country, and transforming public enterprises into private ones.
9 Structural adjustment, external trade and industrial production
On 1 and 3 July 1991 India’s currency was devaluated by 20 per cent. The Government was
optimistic that this would boost exports, reduce imports and bring down the trade deficit India
had built up since the 1980s. Much of this remained wishful thinking as India was not able to
substitute many of its imports. The oil bill had been increasing since the two oil crises of 1973
and 1979. After the start of structural adjustment India’s external trade situation did not improve.
Although exports increased a lot the import bill increased even faster and as a result the trade
deficit reached unknown dimensions, especially after 2005 (see Figure 1).
The impact of devaluation was felt in the first budget. To remain able to pay the country’s
import bill prices for petrol, LPG and aviation fuel increased by 20 per cent. Reduction of
subsidies started with abolishing fertilizer subsidies causing an increase in fertilizer prices by 40
per cent. Soon farmers’ organizations staged protests all over India and forced the Government
to reduce the increase to 30 per cent. Like in many other developing countries high cost for
energy also in India contributed much to inflation, which hit most severely poorer sections of
society.
In 1990/91 the Central Government spent about RS. 25 billion on food subsidies and RS. 44
billion subsidizing fertilizers. Farmers also received support for energy and irrigation facilities.
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In the past 20 years these subsidies have skyrocketed. Producer prices in agriculture also rose.
For many years, plans were discussed to exclude ‘affluent’ consumers from the public distri-
bution system (PDS) of food, but it took until 1997 before concrete changes happened. The PDS,
which until then was open to everybody, was replaced by a targeted public distribution system
(TPDS), where subsidized food was sold only to those below the poverty line (BPL). “The
experience after 1997 shows that TPDS led to the exclusion of a massive section of the poor
from the PDS. There were major mismatches between households classified as APL [above the
poverty line] and their actual standard of living” (Ramakumar 2011, p. 5).
By 1997 the food subsidy had increased to almost Rs. 80 billion. Although the introduction
of the TPDS saw a decline of beneficiaries, food subsidies continued to rise. In 2008 the amount
stood at an unbelievable Rs440 billion, an increase by more than 17 fold since 1991. Alone in
one year, from 2007–2008 to 2008–2009, the fertilizer subsidy increased by more than 133 per
cent, from Rs. 324 billion to more than Rs. 758 billion (see Figure 2).
With the budget for 2011–2012 another attempt has been started to bring down fertilizer and
food subsidies as well as price support for petroleum products. Observers are sceptical that this
time it will be possible to achieve the targets, and if so most likely the most vulnerable sections
of India’s society will be hit worst (Chandrasekhar 2011). Fears are there that the PDS will be
entirely dismantled in an effort of the Government to cut food subsidies. “Scholarly opinion in
India today is significantly in favour of a return to universal PDS. However, a powerful lobby of
the ruling elite and a section of economists are resisting it” (Ramakumar 2011, p. 6). The Indian
Government at the moment considers phasing out the PDS and providing support to people
below the poverty line through food stamps that can be used in any grocery shop or through
Fig. 1. India’s external trade since 1970
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division (various years) Economic Survey.
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direct money transfers. Here it is still entirely unclear what consequences such policy change
would have for those farmers who provide rice and wheat for the PDS and who had benefited
from the enormous food subsidy over decades.
9 Structural adjustment and poverty
Hardly any indicator about the performance of the Indian economy has become more politicized
than its performance to eradicate poverty. In the post-reform era studies are available that
indicate that poverty has even increased during the times of reform (often attributing the increase
to the reforms), most studies however conclude that poverty has gone down considerably. Here
the question often is if it went down faster than before the reforms started or if the decline of
poverty has slowed down. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (1999) indicate one of the most significant
consequences of structural adjustment had been an increase in rural poverty. According to
figures derived from various rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS), poverty in India
stood at around 35 per cent when economic reforms started in 1991. At that time around 291
million people in India were below the poverty line. Until the end of 1992 the share of poor had
increased to 40.7 per cent of the population seeing 348 million people below the poverty line,
some 57 million more than at the beginning of the reform process. In subsequent years the
figures fluctuated between 35 and 37 per cent and 320–349 million in absolute numbers. The
figures for the 1990s are not undisputed and for the first years of the twenty-first century
government sources report of a substantial decline in poverty. In its Economic Survey 2010–11)
the Government sees 26.1 per cent of India’s population below the poverty line, or around 280
million people (Government of India, Economic Survey 2011, p. 297). Even if we apply this
Fig. 2. Development in agricultural subsidies and food subsidy
Sources: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division (various years) Economic Survey, Sharma
and Thaker (2009).
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more optimistic poverty estimation it means that at least one out of four Indians live below the
poverty line, a quarter of almost 1.2 billion people, not much different to the population of the
United States. More than 66 per cent the country’s population live on less than two US dollars
a day (Thakurta and Raghuraman 2007).
Srinivasan (2004) highlights that there had been a significant widening in regional disparities
and inequalities at the expense of rural regions since the reforms of 1991 started. This might turn
out to be more important that the absolute number of poor. Often this spatial variation is seen as
a variation between rural and urban areas, but the real picture obviously is more complex:
looking at regional disparities in India Srinivasan (2004) identifies Punjab and Haryana as
the two states in India with the lowest rural poverty ratio in 1999–2000. Both states stand for
high productive commercial agriculture in India. It seems that under conditions like in these two
states, farmers can do reasonably well, especially as enormous subsidies flow into agriculture
and over the past ten years or so India was exporting substantial amount of cereals at high
international prices (see Figure 3). There is no doubt that this also had upward pressure on
internal cereal prices. Much bigger challenges to provide sufficient livelihood to rural popula-
tions are usually reported from agriculturally disadvantaged rural areas, such as the interior of
Orissa, Karnataka, parts of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Here small and marginal farmers who often
have to purchase part of their food requirements and agricultural workers who do not produce
food for themselves suffer most from very high food prices over recent years.
While poverty in India did not decline as hoped, the cost-of-living indices for agricultural as
well as industrial workers went up. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (1999) explain this mainly as a
consequence of rises in administered prices when the government tried to bring its fiscal deficit
down by cutting subsidies for food grains and energy. Between December 1991 and February
1994 there had been several steep increases of the issue price for PDS food grains, which
resulted in an 86 per cent increase for rice purchased through Fair Price Shops. Also Bardhan
Fig. 3. Net imports (+) / exports (-) of cereals 1951–2009)
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division (various years) Economic Survey.
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(2010) speaks of a decline in the growth rate for real wages in the period 1993–2005 compared
to the previous decade. There are lots of incidences that declining real wages hit especially those
who neither could benefit from rather high prices for agricultural commodities nor who at least
received part of the ever increasing food subsidy in the form of increasing procurement prices
(i.e., bigger farmers who produced meaningful surpluses).
10 Structural adjustment and employment
High economic growth does not necessarily lead to high employment growth. Before 1991
India’s economy expanded mainly through higher productivity rather than additional employ-
ment. Between 1972–1977 employment increased by 0.61 per cent for each percentage increase
in GDP, for 1977–1983 this came down to 0.55 per cent and for the period between 1983–1988
it stood at 0.38 per cent (Ghosh 1993). Having the 1980s in mind Kurien (1994, p. 97) remarks:
“A decade in which the growth rate was the highest, the increase in employment was the lowest”.
To reach full employment until 2002 India’s labour force was to increase by about 35 million
between 1992 and 1997, and by another 36 million in the following five years. In 1992 there was
already a deficit of 23 million jobs. Between 1992 and 2002 around 94 million new jobs was
needed to achieve full employment (Ghosh 1993). Prospects were looking grim already in the
1980s: when economic growth was rather comfortable, employment in the private sector
declined from 4.6 million to 4.3 million between 1981 and 1988. Formal sector employment was
more or less stagnant throughout the 1980s when industrial production increased by 7 to 8 per
cent in most years. In the reform period public sector employment decreased considerably.
Additional jobs in the private sector could compensate this loss (see Figure 4), but were far too
Fig. 4. Change in formal sector employment since 1991
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division (various years) Economic Survey.
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little to ease the situation of un- and underemployment, in an economy where annually around
7 million new jobs are needed to just let the situation not become worse.
More recently the impact of the global financial and economic crisis has resulted in huge job
losses in various segments of the labour market. A government report estimated that between
September and December 2008 about half a million jobs were lost (Chandrasekhar 2009). In
these figures probably the most explosive challenges lie for India’s future. Despite excellent
economic growth, employment in the formal sector has hardly increased. Privatization of many
public enterprises and a huge increase in foreign investment had not only positive impacts on
labour markets. Public enterprises often were ‘over-staffed’ and as a result of privatization made
more efficient, which means that jobs disappeared. Foreign investment often had similar
impacts, especially when foreign companies took over existing production sites (portfolio
investment, see Figure 5) instead of creating new ones, rationalization made many jobs redun-
dant. Growth without development refers in particular to the generation of decent employment.
Here the Indian economy is still performing much below expectation.
11 The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment in India
Those speaking in favour of economic reforms highlight that the earlier order had hindered
private investment and led to misallocation of resources because state elites misused their
political and administrative power to enrich themselves (rent seeking), weakening econ-
omic performance. However over four decades of economic development strong government
Fig. 5. Foreign investment in India (1990–2009)
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division (various years) Economic Survey.
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involvement had not always jeopardized economic growth and private investment. No doubt, the
‘licensing Raj’ enabled politicians and administrators to siphon off huge amounts from bribes.
Still it is doubtful, if industrial development was hindered or delayed as India’s private industry
enjoyed a rather efficient protection behind high tariff walls. It was able to get returns on their
investments, often considerably higher than in other countries. Especially India’s big business
houses benefited from the licensing mania. They could afford to employ whole sections spe-
cializing in navigating the jungle of laws, regulations and procedures. They had advantages
over smaller companies who drowned in the flood of forms and regulations. As they were
wealthy enough to make things happen they were not only protected by the system in place from
international competition, but also from internal rivals.
Economic expansion in India was restricted because of wide spread poverty and limited
purchasing power of the masses. With the SAP big business houses saw a chance becoming
global players instead of improving effective demand in India. To perform well internationally
technological modernization was needed as high import restrictions of earlier decades had
delayed modernization. Many factories were far from state of the art, and without technological
modernization, export orientation for industrial products was hardly feasible. Concentrating on
big business development also meant slow expansion of employment while neglecting agricul-
ture and small and medium enterprises. Agriculture took the role to provide cheap food for the
industrial workforce. This helped to keep wages moderate, but at the same time led to an
impoverishment of small and marginal farmers. Medium and big farmers at least had their
fertilizer- and energy subsidies, subsidized loans that were written off once elections came
closer and ever increasing procurement prices for the public distribution system. Consumers felt
the consequences of this old economic structure as consumer items were costlier and of lower
quality compared to international standards. Structural adjustment created new forms of ‘rent
seeking’, forms that are closely connected to privatization. Selling the ‘crown jewels’ might have
helped the government to raise some funds urgently needed for debt repayment in the short run;
in the long run these assets and the income that could be realized from them were gone forever
as were many jobs.
Compared to the early 1990s many macro-economic indicators have improved little. In fact
they often worsened, in particular what international debts, state deficit and subsidies are
concerned. What has been achieved is the disinvestment of state properties for the benefit of
private investors as well as the opening of India’s economy for foreign investors.
Right from the beginning of the reform, Trades Unions and farmers’ organizations had
called for massive demonstrations, most of them remained peaceful. The largest organized
protest against the government’s industrial policy took place on 25 November 25, 1992 in New
Delhi which followed two nationwide strikes on 25 November 1991 and 16 June 1992 (Walton
and Seddon 1994). The protest was against the government’s liberalization policy in general and
against multinational corporations entering India in particular.
Conclusion
Structural adjustment was not merely an effort to modernize the country’s economy and tie it
closer to the world economy. The reforms meant a new division of labour between state and
private engagement in the economy. The idea of a ‘mixed economy’ which was established by
economic elites in the years before independence, which was diluted by Indira Gandhi in the
mid-1970s and later by Rajiv Gandhi in his liberalization attempt in the 1980s, was entirely
given up after 1991. The 1980s saw an opening of many sectors to private investors that earlier
had been reserved for the state. In the 1990s the state was actually withdrawing from these
activities.
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India’s economic history of the past 65 years shows that economic crisis always came along
with political instability that more often than not escalated into different forms of mass violence:
the suicide of about 200,000 farmers all over India between 1995 and 2006 (Nagaraj 2008)
speaks volumes about the neglect of rural areas. Also the emergence of farmer movements in the
second half of the 1980s and other organized protests in the mid-1970s show that there is large
scale violence often connected with social and economic dissatisfaction. Although a healthy
economy is a precondition to development the improvement of macro-economic indicators is
insufficient to diagnose development.
Throughout the past 65 years economic crisis did not mean that big business houses
suffered; more often it was ordinary people. Big business had their interests taken care of. They
did very well under a tight protection of tax walls and licensing built by the Government. When
lack of internal effective demand restricted further expansion India’s economy became more
export oriented. This was not only true for big business, but high exports of cereals especially
in the first decade of the twenty-first century shows that also agricultural commodity flows are
directly to when the highest purchasing power is.
There is a danger that dissatisfaction is increasing and like in 1967, 1975, 1989 and 1996 this
dissatisfaction easily destabilized not only the Congress Government, but the country as such.
This does not necessarily mean that huge sections of India’s population get poorer as a result of
the reforms. It however seems that the gap between the really poor and those doing well is
increasing. Such social polarization causes more dissatisfaction, frustration than if all would be
poor. Here is an enormous potential for conflict, which might explode once the Government
becomes stricter on cutting down subsidies, especially food subsidies. Both poor consumers, but
even more the middle and big farmers who receive bigger parts of these subsidies would be
affected by this.
In 1975 and 1990 destabilization brought the country close to civil war. On both occasions
it was poorer sections of India’s society who had demanded their share from the development
process. If it is not possible to transfer economic success into a social success story then the
dangers of political instability and violence so far unheard of in India have the potential to
plunge the entire Asian region into chaos and violence.
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